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Africa and the export of China’s clean energy revolution 
 
 
Abstract: The spectacular scale and speed of China’s domestic renewable energy capacity 
development and technology catch-up has in recent years been followed by the ‘go out’ of 
Chinese clean energy technology firms seeking new markets and opportunities in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This paper explores the growing involvement of China in the development and transfer 
of renewable energy technologies in Africa and examines the key drivers and obstacles 
shaping Chinese renewable energy investments and exports. Far from there being some kind 
of grand or harmonious strategy directed by a single monolithic state we argue that fragmented 
and decentralised state apparatuses and quasi-market actors in China are increasingly 
pursuing their own independent interests and agendas around renewable energy in Africa in 
ways often marked by conflict, inconsistency and incoherence. Moving beyond the state-centric 
analysis common in much of the research on contemporary China-Africa relations we examine 
the motivations of a range of non-state and quasi-state actors as well their different perceptions 
and constructions of risk, policy environments and political stability in recipient countries. The 
paper explores the case study example of South Africa where Chinese firms have become 
increasingly significant in the diffusion of renewable energy technology.  
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Introduction: China and the energy challenges facing Africa 
 
 
Improving access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy services is widely 
regarded as an urgent and critical challange that is key to unlocking Africa’s development 
potential. Africa’s economy and accompanying energy demand has almost doubled in size 
since the turn of the century and it is estimated that it will see further increases in energy 
demand of up to 80% by 2030 (IEA 2014). Within sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) energy demand 
grew by around 45% from 2000 to 2012, but accounts for only 4% of the world total, despite 
being home to 13% of the global population1. Addressing the continent’s growing energy needs 
is seen as vital not just to its economic growth and development but to the eradication of 
poverty. Access to modern energy services, though increasing, remains limited: despite many 
positive efforts, more than 620 million people in SSA remain without access to electricity and 
nearly 730 million rely on the traditional use of solid biomass for cooking2. Bioenergy – mostly 
wood and charcoal - accounts for 60% of energy demand in Africa with many of those in rural 
areas still dependent on the use of traditional cookstoves that are often inefficient or create 
significant health problems as a result of indoor air pollution.  
 
Renewable energy technologies in particular have emerged as essential to meeting Africa’s 
energy needs, in part because of increasing international recognition of the nexus between 
energy access, climate change and environmental sustainability more broadly. The pursuit of 
sustainable energy access is now recognized as one of the sustainable development goals 
(SDGs) which in turn have built on previous international initiatives such as the UN-led SE4ALL 
(Sustainable Energy for All) global initiative which sought to universalize energy access, 
increase the share of renewables in the energy mix and to improve energy efficiency, all by 
2030. As the costs of low-carbon energy fall, Africa is widely seen by many donors to have an 
opportunity to ‘leapfrog’ into a new era of economic growth and expansion driven by clean 
power generation.  
 
This paper seeks to analyze the increasingly significant role that China is playing in the 
diffusion of renewable energy technologies in Africa and focuses in particular on China’s 
engagement with Africa’s emerging wind and solar energy sectors. In recent years the growing 
importance of ‘rising powers’ like China in the African continent has attracted considerable 
attention and controversy. China’s (re)emergence as an international development actor in 
Africa’s energy sector has often been characterized as simply about the exploitative acquisition 
of natural resources such as coal, oil and gas3, or as a kind of neo-colonial resource ‘grab’ and 
plundering of Africa reminiscent of the darkest days of empire4. What such representations 
preclude, however, is recognition of the simultaneous and growing involvement of China in the 
development and transfer of renewable energy technologies in Africa and its potential 
significance in reconfiguring a range of energy systems within the continent5.  
 
Facing a saturated domestic market and fierce competition in European and US markets, 
Chinese companies are now advancing into Africa with a full range of commercial activities 
along the production chain, including the export of wind turbines and solar panels, the 
development of new equipment manufacturing facilities, and the financing and construction of 
new renewable energy generation facilities such as wind or solar farms6. China’s increasing 
engagement in the promotion of renewable energy projects in Africa seems to have gone 
almost unnoticed but how significant is this engagement, what form does it take and how can it 
best be explained? While much has been written about large Chinese hydropower projects in 
Africa7, analysis of China’s engagement with renewable energy technologies on the continent 
is scarce. More generally, work on Sino-African relations and energy cooperation has typically 
focused largely on extractive industries such as coal and gas understood in a narrow sense as 
synonymous with the activities of the (mercantilist) state but it is also necessary to look beyond 
the state, at the transnational activities of non-governmental actors like corporations and at the 
Chinese domestic dynamics that shape overseas (renewable) energy co-operation. 
 
In the past decade the Chinese government has shown increased commitments to promote a 
low-energy intensive and low-carbon economy and the expansion of renewable energy is a 
central part of this strategy8. As China’s renewable energy industries grow, Chinese green 
technology companies are starting to assert themselves in international markets and low 
carbon collaboration and assistance are increasingly becoming features of the country’s foreign 
cooperation strategy9. At the fourth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2009 the 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao announced 100 clean energy projects across Africa including 
some small-scale projects focused on solar energy10. At the fifth FOCAC meeting in South 
Africa in December 2015 China pledged US$60 billion for a variety of areas of China-Africa 
co-operation, including renewables and technology transfer. China's role as a promoter of 
renewable energy development in Africa can offer it valuable recognition as a contributor to 
global efforts towards the mitigation of climate change and can serve to reaffirm its position as 
a lead nation among developing countries, protecting vulnerable countries from the impacts of 
global warming and fostering their economic growth and development in the process11.  
 
In this paper we aim to identify the major drivers leading to the advancement of Chinese 
companies into African wind and solar energy markets. Our intervention draws on 
multi-institutional and interdisciplinary research conducted over thirty months between 2012 
and 2015 in which we sought to examine how, why and to what extent China is playing a role in 
enabling the transition to low carbon energy systems in Southern Africa12. Our analysis is 
informed by a series of in-depth interviews13 undertaken in China and South Africa and by the 
creation of a database of low carbon energy projects in South Africa established to understand 
investment trends. The data was gathered using policy reports, press releases and web-based 
sources and then triangulated with findings from interviews and project site visits.  
 
The paper is divided into four sections. In the first we set out our analytical approach for making 
sense of the roles of Chinese non-state actors in Africa’s renewable energy expansion. In the 
second section we then examine the explosive growth of China’s wind and solar energy 
industries and the development of the domestic markets around these renewable energy 
technologies, along with some of the growing challenges that Chinese firms now face as a 
result of intensifying global competition and the contraction of demand. In the third section we 
then explore the domestic institutional complex and policy environment within China which has 
encouraged and supported their growth, focusing in particular on the neglected role of 
quasi-state agencies such as the development or export-import banks and export credit 
agencies. In the final section we discuss the key drivers and barriers shaping the ‘go out’ 
strategy of Chinese renewable energy companies in Africa and explore the specific example of 
South Africa where Chinese companies are now playing a growing role in renewable energy 
technology transfer and in the transition to a low-carbon development pathway. 
 
China’s non-state actors in Africa’s renewable energy sector: an analytical approach 
 
 
In contrast to previous studies regarding China’s involvement in Africa that typically begin with 
or focus on the state, we begin our analysis by focusing on the key actors within China’s 
domestic wind and solar industries since, as Breslin14 argues, political and economic dynamics 
at the local and national level are important in making sense of China’s growing significance in 
the global South. In doing this we seek to understand the broader political economy of China’s 
emerging engagements with African energy systems by looking at the range of actors, 
institutions, partnerships and policy-making processes involved. We seek to move beyond the 
simplistic notion that it is only state-led support from the Chinese central government that is 
behind the rapid expansion of Chinese investment, instead arguing that a very complex set of 
institutional dynamics can be observed within and beyond China that comprises quasi-state 
agencies (such as development banks and export credit agencies) and non-state actors (such 
as private companies).  
 
Although China is an authoritarian state with a powerful central government and a complex 
configuration of public and private spheres15, we argue that it is problematic to treat quasi-state 
development agencies, SOEs and large private corporations as mere dependents of the state 
or ‘barnacles on the ship’16 that only respond to central government command. On the contrary, 
our research shows that these institutions have their own strategies and motivations for 
entering and engaging African markets. In addition, these actors’ operations are increasingly 
embedded within globalized renewable energy production networks and value chains that 
exceed the control and authority of particular states17. A focus on global production networks 
and value chains is valuable here in that it helps to offset more macro-scale, geopolitical 
interpretations by taking an actor-centric approach to understanding the variegated, country 
and industry-specific development implications of south-south trade flows18. 
 
Sinologists have long emphasised the rise of a ‘fragmented authoritarianism’19, within an 
increasingly ‘deconstructed’ state20 and it is important to recognise that the Chinese state has 
been reshaped and is now more fragmented and disaggregated as a result of decentralisation 
and internationalisation21. In this paper we seek to illustrate what this fragmentation and 
disaggregation means for the expansion of Chinese renewable energy enterprises in Africa by 
highlighting the range of different quasi-state actors involved and the roles they are playing in 
the ‘go out’ of Chinese firms.  
 
Our argument is not that the Chinese government is no longer relevant – clearly the expansion 
of Chinese involvement in African’s renewable energy development is, in many ways, 
complimentary to wider Chinese central government strategies for ‘foreign cooperation’ with the 
continent. This does not mean however that all renewable energy related activities carried out 
by Chinese companies are specifically led or guided by state departments. As Breslin22 
correctly points out, the overseas operations of many Chinese companies are predominantly 
driven by the pursuit of commercial objectives. In our analysis we seek to draw out how these 
non-state commercial actors view and understand the African markets they are seeking to enter 
along with the range of domestic ‘push’ factors motivating their go out and the range of ‘pull’ 
factors that are drawing Chinese actors toward opportunities in emerging renewable energy 
markets such as South Africa (see figure 1)..   
 
 
China’s wind and solar energy sectors at a crossroads 
 
In the past decade, the Chinese central government has exhibited considerable ambition to 
decarbonize its economy and elevate its coal-dominant energy mix by enhancing the share of 
renewable energies at the energy supply side. In some quarters renewable energy has been 
seen as the driving force 23  for China’s third industrial revolution (第三次工业革命 ), 
emphasizing its strategic value for China to shake off the negative geopolitical impact of fossil 
fuels imports and to achieve energy security. That said the spectacular recent build-up of 
renewable energy capacity in China is not primarily driven by climate change imperatives - the 
key concerns have been securing energy and building globally competitive industries or 
‘building energy security through manufacturing’24. In the case of wind power, the total installed 
capacity in China reached over 145 GW by the end of 2015, up from just 2.6 GW in 200625, 
China installed nearly half of the 63 gigawatts of wind power added globally in 2015 and now 
accounts for about a third of the world’s total installed wind power capacity26. Since 2013 there 
has not been a single foreign manufacturer in the top ten list of wind turbine manufacturers in 
China, indicating both a fast maturing domestic wind manufacturing industry and a highly 
protective domestic market environment. 
 
The important role of the state in China’s wind energy sector has been well documented in the 
existing literature27. Some of this work has touched on the role the Chinese government has 
played in shaping international competition28 or in speeding up the process of technology 
transfer 29 . Supportive government policies have included tax redistribution to reward 
technology upgrade and the provision of cash subsidies for the delivery of large-scale (1MW+) 
turbines. Protectionism has also had a role to play as the key regulator, the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), insisted on a local content requirement (over 
70%) for domestic wind farms between 2005 and 2010, which helped to cultivate some world 
leading turbine suppliers during this period, such as Goldwind, Sinovel and United Power. 
Successful firms have often grown out of existing industrial facilities such as previously large 
heavy-machinery manufacturers or state-owned power utility firms, which possess strong 
capabilities and expertise for manufacturing processes and the management of large-scale 
project investments.  
 
After a decade of explosive growth, Chinese wind industries currently face a number of 
significant challenges however. In some ways the unprecedented ‘wind rush’ became an 
unbearable burden for the grid companies (who are required by law to take and pay for all the 
wind energy produced) and for the grid networks that have struggled to keep pace in terms of 
accommodating such large amounts of unstable wind energy resources into the grid system30. 
Consequently, some wind farms have been prevented from sending their power to the grid and 
the NDRC’s Energy Bureau has had to halt the pace of further wind farm development until 
these connection problems are fully resolved. There is also declining local government interest 
in supporting wind farm investment, mainly because these projects have often failed to deliver 
the anticipated tax revenues and benefits to local economic and social development. 
Consequently, in recent years many local government officials have been keener to promote 
turbine manufacturing facilities in order to enhance local tax revenue and boost employment. 
The previous ‘wind resources for power generation’ model has thus been replaced by a new 
‘wind resources for turbine factories’ model. 
 
As new investment in wind farms has been slowing since 2010 and with more production 
facilities being added across the country, a significant surplus of manufacturing capability has 
emerged. Meanwhile, in order to deal with issues of over-capacity Chinese regulators have 
been restricting the space for further wind energy development. New policies from the NDRC 
have, since 2012, stipulated that no new project will be approved until the grid connection and 
accommodation problems are fully resolved in some areas31. It is in this context of a saturated 
domestic market and political constraints on domestic capacity development that Chinese firms 
have increasingly turned their attentions overseas. Before 2008, very few Chinese turbines had 
been installed in any country outside China and exports accounted for just 4.3% of Chinese 
turbine manufacturers’ total sales volume (see figures 2 and 3). Between 2007 and 2013, the 
export destinations for Chinese wind turbine manufacturers increased from one to 
twenty-seven countries with Chinese wind turbine exports more than tripling between 2011 and 
201332. China’s Goldwind exported some 361 MW worth of turbines in 2013 alone, more than 
all of the other Chinese manufacturers combined.  
 
Lema et al33 argue that the size and rapid growth of the Chinese market have a major 
influence on competitive parameters in the global wind power industry, changing industry 
dynamics and the international pecking order of lead firms. They distinguish between the 
following five categories of Chinese economic power: production power, coordination power, 
innovation power, market power, and financing power, arguing that the combination of Chinese 
market and manufacturing capability is beginning to change the face of this industry, not just in 
Asia but globally. Chinese wind turbine makers can, for example, draw on a modular supply 
chain, which provides considerable advantages in terms of cost and speed. Realising this 
potential requires a coordination power that Chinese firms have begun to demonstrate both in 
the domestic and external market. There is also a Chinese competitive advantage based on the 
ability to combine high speed and low costs complemented with financial options (e.g. Chinese 
firms providing supplier credits to their customers) that Western suppliers may find difficult to 
match. The headlines which emphasise competition or conflict between Western and Chinese 
companies often fail to capture the complexity of the current situation and whilst competition 
among lead firms is increasing, there are also prospects for a growth of inter-firm collaboration 
all along the value chain.  
 
The wind energy industry consists of firms which are part of two distinct, though 
interconnected, value chains: (a) the manufacturing chain concerned with designing, producing 
and assembling the equipment and (b) the deployment-services chain concerned with all 
aspects related to deployment and utilisation, including pre-project financing and post-project 
operation and maintenance. It is the turbine manufacturers and suppliers in the manufacturing 
chain who have so far driven increases in flows of trade and FDI. Dominant firms – from China 
and Europe in particular, but also from the US and India – compete head to head for market 
share. By comparison, firms in the deployment chain – such as utilities, wind park construction 
firms, operation and maintenance (O&M) providers and technical consultancy firms – are less 
globalised34. Key parts (in terms of cost) are towers, blades, gearboxes and power converters, 
but a turbine is made up of more than 8,000 different components. 
 
By comparison to the wind sector, the solar sector in China is a much more export-oriented 
industry since 95% of solar products produced in China were exported before 201235, exposing 
the industry to global economic downturns and shifting patterns of foreign demand. Most of the 
today’s top solar PV manufacturers in China were established between 2003 and 2006, when a 
surge of purchasing orders from EU countries like Germany and Spain, who had announced 
ambitious feed-in tariff schemes, ignited a frenzied process of production capacity expansion. 
According to many of our interviewees, local business and government leaders at that time 
looked at the fast developing PV industry as a ‘golden opportunity’ for quick profits and rapid 
growth and as a result many local corporate leaders from other industries were persuaded by 
local government officers to shift to solar PV production. Consequently, the reckless expansion 
led to serious oversupply problems with PV panels and cells since around 2010 and the 
domestic deployment of solar power has lagged far behind the domestic expansion of the PV 
production industry.  
 
The situation became even worse after European countries started to cut subsidies to the solar 
power sector from 2010 with exports to Europe contracting by over 50% in 2013 alone36. The 
rise of renewable energy protectionism37 has also sparked off several anti-dumping and 
anti-subsidy investigations towards Chinese PV products from the US and EU. This sudden 
drop in sales in US and EU markets (see figure 4) was the ‘last straw’ leading to the collapse of 
many Chinese PV manufacturers and between 2012 and 2013, dozens of manufacturers 
announced bankruptcy, including Suntech, the once largest PV producer in the country. More 
companies simply shut down their operations and remained idle.  
 
The dire market situation forced the Chinese government to rescue the industry by encouraging 
domestic deployment of solar energy38, which led to a rocketing of investment in solar farms. 
China added 15 GW of solar PV capacity during 2015, a 40% increase on 2014, bringing the 
country’s total solar PV capacity up to 43 GW39. China has since become one of the largest 
solar power deployment markets in the world, yet even this massive investment in solar power 
generation will not fully accommodate or address the capacity surplus. The domestic market is 
only able to accommodate less than 50% of the current overall production capacity. It is in this 
context that many PV manufacturers have started to look at market opportunities outside the 
EU and US, turning their attentions instead toward emerging renewable energy markets 
including Africa. As a result, there was a massive jump in the value of Chinese solar panel 
exports to Africa between 2012 and 2013, from barely US$1.46 million to over US$566 million 
(see figure 5), although this has gradually decreased since then.   
 
Quasi-state agencies and the ‘going out’ of China’s wind and solar companies 
 
‘we cannot treat the Chinese state as monolithic, or “China Inc.,” in which everything works 
in harmony…the Chinese state’s functionality is riddled with competing state agencies, 
problems of cross-department coordination, and [a] mismatch between central and local 
policies’40.  
 
The array of corporations and government bureaucracies involved in meeting China’s policy 
objectives in Africa is far more complex than is typically assumed41. These agencies have their 
own strategies, motivations and practices that cannot simply be understood as a subset of 
national interests42 though they are broadly in line with state policies and political agendas. It 
is thus highly simplistic to view these quasi-state institutions as mere instruments or tools of the 
central government43. It is also quite misleading to suggest that the Chinese government is 
singularly and centrally orchestrating overseas investment and export activities in the ‘go out’ to 
Africa.  
 
The central government has withdrawn from directly controlling production and distribution, 
retreating instead to a ‘regulatory state’ model, setting broad macroeconomic policies for other 
public and private actors44. Many agencies, regulatory bodies and subnational units have thus 
developed their own international policies and relationships, breaking the monopoly of foreign 
and defence ministries and consequently a variety of quasi-state actors are increasingly 
pursuing their own independent interests and agendas overseas, ‘generating conflict-ridden, 
incoherent policy output, often mistakenly interpreted as “grand strategy”’45. Thus, state 
decentralisation has fostered ‘paradiplomacy’ by subnational agencies, turning them into 
quasi-autonomous foreign policy actors46. 
 
What outsiders may perceive as an apparently powerful central government and unified system 
of governance is in fact ‘a fragmented and chaotic structure over which the central government 
has little control’47. Outcomes reflect not authoritative central decisions, but rather ‘bargaining… 
horizontally between government ministries, agencies and state enterprises, as well as 
vertically, between different levels of government’, which ‘continues throughout 
implementation’48. Further, the governance of renewable energy industries in China has been 
concentrated in the hands of a small number of bureaucrats, investors and manufacturing 
corporations who have formed an informal coalition that has the capabilities to negotiate, shape 
and even deter renewable energy policy development. Thus much of this horizontal and vertical 
bargaining process happens within or around this informal coalition. 
 
Further, government officers’ direct control over overseas commercial activities is actually 
decreasing. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), for example, does not have direct authority 
over any of the SOEs’ operating in Africa and has conflicting internal interests, given its dual 
responsibilities to both support Chinese corporations going overseas and to regulate them. The 
combination of multiple oversight bureaucracies, competing companies, and their conflicting 
interests suggests that Chinese firms are likely to act in ways that are not always in complete 
synchrony with diplomatic objectives49. The direct control that central government agencies had 
over the export sector is therefore much less tight compared to the pre-reform era as the 
bureaucratic hurdles for export and overseas investment have significantly diminished. As one 
government officer from MOFCOM put it: 
 
‘Nowadays we cannot interfere too much with corporate investment decisions. If they 
[companies] insist on going somewhere we can’t stop them…As government agencies we 
can only provide our suggestions and opinions’50.  
 
The relaxation of regulatory control from government ministries has created further space for 
autonomy for a complex of quasi-governmental development and financial agencies that have 
become de facto second-tier governance entities operating between the public and private 
spheres (see figure 6). These institutions, including export credit agencies, Eximbank, the 
China Development Bank and other financial institutions, provide crucial services that are 
needed to carry out overseas projects, particularly in emerging markets. The role sharing 
among these institutions is clear and specific. Eximbank is the key player in providing 
concessional loans and export finance to support Chinese companies’ large scale exports of 
capital intensive goods or their EPC (Engineering, Procurement and Construction) contracts. 
The China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure) provides export credit insurance 
or guarantee services to project activities in highly risky and volatile markets. The China 
Development Bank and its subsidiary institution, the Sino-African Fund (SAF), provide both 
loans and equity investment for Chinese overseas investments. Lastly, other Chinese state 
banks can provide peripheral and additional finance in cases where the above mentioned 
institutions are not able to serve all the Chinese companies at a given time or in particular 
destination countries.  
 
Without these agencies most overseas projects could not possibly be implemented on the 
ground. Their internal policies, decision making process and risk appetite can significantly 
impact on the configuration and orientation of Chinese exports and investment, shaping what 
kind of projects emerge and where, even though they still have to follow broader directions and 
guidelines from their line ministries. Further, these organizations are actively searching for new 
market opportunities for Chinese enterprises because their institutional influence relies heavily 
on the expansion of their portfolios. The greater their perceived importance to the Chinese 
economy the more political influence they are likely to have:  
 
‘We can’t just sit in the office waiting for enterprises to approach us. We have to be more 
proactive, otherwise the value of our organization will be put in question’51. 
 
In seeking access to emerging African markets the need and demand for such support is 
particularly high due to the perception of risks and the shortage of funding available in host 
countries. Many of these institutions have been focusing on infrastructure, energy or other 
capital intensive markets in the global South for decades and consequently have accumulated 
sufficient experience and expertise regarding the wider political and market situation within host 
countries in Africa and the implementation of EPC contracts, equity investment or export 
finance. They also have access to better information channels from host countries and to local 
political and market elites and it is not uncommon for senior company representatives to join 
the diplomatic delegation in visiting different countries, giving them an invaluable insight into 
the investment priorities and interests of host governments and a ‘heads up’ on possible future 
projects. In recent years these institutions have also established branches, subsidiaries or 
informal working groups within host countries to further establish and develop their networks 
with local actors and to gather relevant information regarding potential deals.   
 
Taking China’s export of solar panels as an example, our fieldwork revealed that the CDB and 
Sinosure were the key players in identifying market opportunities in Europe after European 
countries had launched ambitious subsidy programs from 2006. In the next few years generous 
credit lines were offered by the CDB to major Chinese PV exporters which amounted to over 
RMB 34 billion (US$5.25 billion) by 2011, including support for 650MW of overseas solar 
generation capacity52. Meanwhile, Sinosure also encouraged Chinese exporters to explore the 
European market by offering an attractive insurance premium package53. Similarly, for wind 
energy projects the role of quasi-state institutions is also crucial with, for example, the 
Sino-African Fund introducing South Africa’s Renewable Energy Independent Power 
Producers’ Procurement Programme (RE IPPPP) to the companies they worked with and 
encouraging corporations like GCL-Poly and Powerway to venture into the South African wind 
market54. South Africa’s ongoing electricity crisis has created opportunities for the development 
of different energy technologies and the procurement models that facilitate them55 and has led 
to an investment of some US$14bn in the country’s electricity infrastructure. Agencies like the 
SAF have thus played a key role in introducing such emerging markets in Africa (and the 
lucrative opportunities available there) to Chinese firms. Solar energy companies such as BYD, 
Jinko, Yingli, Trina, Chint, Suntech and Hanwha Solar have subsequently become active in 
South Africa along with wind energy firms like Longyuan, Sinovel and United Power. 
 
It is worth remembering that there is no specific Chinese government policy focused on 
promoting the ‘go out’ of renewable energy companies and our research found little evidence to 
illustrate China’s direct political intervention and support to the export and investment activities 
of its renewable sectors in Africa. Even though their activities may be welcomed by central 
government agencies the support they provide to exporters and investors is not driven, directed 
or even motivated by a singular and coherent government strategy. Therefore, their willingness 
to promote renewable energy business opportunities is mainly about the advancement of their 
own institutional interests. Although there is no specific requirement from government to 
promote exports of renewable energy technologies or to invest in renewable industries, these 
institutions are actively exploring market opportunities and expanding their sectoral influence in 
this area. They can also have a significant impact on the risk perceptions held by Chinese 
enterprises seeking to invest in or export to Africa, boosting the confidence of exporters or 
investors by using their expertise and referencing previous successes in order to demonstrate 
that African markets are not as risky as new market entrants might imagine. 
 
 
Chinese renewable investment in Africa: key drivers and barriers 
 
 
Our research suggests that Chinese renewable energy companies, far from being centrally 
orchestrated and coordinated by an ambitious and monolithic state, were rather ‘pushed’ out by 
intense competition in domestic markets and by the need to deal with over-production, excess 
capacity and over-investment along with a number of severe economic and political challenges 
both domestically and globally. These companies first began to explore the African market so as 
to find new export destinations and upgrade their operations in order to survive the crisis and 
the serious oversupply problems at home and sharp demand contraction from overseas 
markets. Most of the companies we spoke to admitted that it was these internal and external 
pressures that forced them to shift their focus from mature markets in ‘developed countries’ to 
emerging markets in Africa.  
 
China’s power generation market has been dominated by state-owned enterprises, particularly 
the so called big five utility giants, known as Guodian, Huadian, Huaneng, Datang and the 
China Power Investment Corporation (CPIC). These large corporations take the lion’s share of 
both fossil fuels and renewable energy generation facilities in China56 and had expanded their 
share of the solar market to over 60% by 2014 whilst the top 10 project investors in the wind 
energy sector are currently all SOEs. Although since 2010 the Chinese central government has 
been encouraging private investment in power generation, there has been little actual progress 
in lowering the entry barriers for non-state enterprises and private capital. Wind and solar 
energy development projects are highly capital intensive, needing large scale upfront 
investment which puts SOEs at an absolute advantage compared to private companies due to 
their close connection with Chinese policy makers and state banks.  
 
In order to achieve better quality and cost control, most SOE developers are now venturing into 
the manufacturing realm and actively establishing their own solar panel and cell module 
production facilities. As these facilities are mainly focused on domestic markets or serving the 
power projects developed within the same parent group, they are essentially squeezing the 
market share of private manufacturers. Similarly, in the wind energy sector Guodian, one of the 
big five utility giants, has through its subsidiary wind turbine manufacturer United Power 
become the second largest turbine producer in China. 
 
Manufacturers are often the most vulnerable actors along the production chain and thus many 
see an opportunity in overseas markets to become project developers rather than merely 
operating as exporters. The most active actors to explore African renewable markets are 
therefore those who have been hit hardest along the production chain by domestic and 
overseas market contraction, namely the manufacturers of solar panels and wind turbines, 
such as Jinko, Yingli, Goldwind and Sinovel. Typically, the majority of Chinese overseas 
investment in renewables involves developing or acquiring power generation facilities rather 
than manufacturing sites57, indicating that these companies’ have an ambition to achieve value 
chain upgrade in overseas markets rather than just expand exports, something that cannot be 
easily achieved at home.  
 
The perception of Africa’s macro-economic and political stability is another key factor that 
affects investment decisions. This is not unique to China - regulatory and political uncertainties 
are believed to be the greatest concerns of renewable energy investors in other emerging 
markets such as the Middle East and North Africa58. Many African markets remain something of 
a mystery to the newly arrived Chinese renewable energy companies, who are often more 
familiar with low risk markets in Europe or North America than they are with the uncertainties 
associated with emerging markets (e.g. around currency depreciation or instances of political 
insurgency). Many interviewees noted that these risk concerns are one of the main reasons for 
their companies’ hesitation in venturing into African countries for long-term investment. Such 
concerns can only partly be mitigated by the support of Chinese development agencies. In 
addition, most private companies are more risk averse than state owned enterprises which 
partly explains why Chinese renewable energy investments are currently geographically 
concentrated in just a handful of countries (such as South Africa) perceived to have robust 
financial strength and political stability.  
 
In addition to stimulating investment through policy, the sheer size of South Africa’s renewable 
energy market and the continuing issuing of tenders through the Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producer’s Procurement Programme (RE IPPPP) have created a sense of 
market security59. One Chinese wind investor told us that they are investing in South Africa 
mainly because they believe the political and economic risks in the country are negligible 
compared to other countries in Africa. Such was their confidence in the country they even 
rejected the export credit insurance support cover (a mechanism that aims to protect domestic 
exporters via payment guarantees or insurance) available from Chinese export credit 
agencies60. We also found that Chinese companies look closely at the overall coherence of the 
policy in the long-run and seek to ensure that safety mechanisms are in place to prevent abrupt 
policy changes (given that projects are often so dependent on subsidies)61. 
 
In what are perceived to be more ‘mature’ or established markets, Chinese solar exporters 
have often set up foreign subsidiaries mainly to acquire new technologies, to support the export 
of their products manufactured in China, or to invest in solar power plants in order to open up 
new markets for their products and equipment. In Africa however, very few of these investment 
types can be found although many companies we spoke to claim that they are now giving this 
serious consideration. Most Chinese renewable energy companies believe however that their 
current priority in African markets is still the sale of equipment rather than direct investment, 
partly due to their limited experience on the continent and their caution and apprehension 
towards the risks associated with FDI in this unfamiliar market62. To date Chinese companies 
have been involved in South Africa’s RE IPPPP largely either as suppliers or manufacturers63 
of technological components for PV. One exception is Jinko Solar which opened an R80 million 
(US$ 7.4 million) solar PV factory in Cape Town in 2014, built to service the demand that has 
been created through RE-IPPPP and enabling Jinko to maintain the largest share of South 
Africa’s solar market of approximately 30%. Jinko chose South Africa because the country has 
local content requirements that it could fulfill by having a factory there for manufacturing 
modules locally in order to meet local guidelines around black empowerment, thereby making 
the firm a more eligible supplier for RE-IPPPP solar projects. At present Jinko is purely a 
supplier in South Africa but it is considering entering future tenders as a developer and 
independent power producer.  
 
Africa has excellent potential for wind and solar energy but to date both energy sources have 
played a limited role in the continent’s power generation mix due to limited electricity 
infrastructures (particularly those required for transmission and distribution) and insufficient 
financial or technological support for implementing and maintaining large scale projects64. As a 
result, many of the Chinese businesses we spoke to believe the overall market size for the 
development of renewable energy will remain relatively small at least in the near future. 
Sub-Saharan Africa is also perceived to be more challenging to Chinese investors because 
there is not yet a scaled ‘pool’ of potential projects in most countries, which can transform 
theoretical renewable resources into actual capacities. The contrast in market scale is 
particularly dramatic compared to the huge market size at home - leading Chinese companies 
can often secure a gigawatts level market share in China annually but in Africa they have to 
compete fiercely with world class companies for megawatts level projects.  
 
The fast reviving domestic market for solar power development has, to an extent, also diverted 
Chinese manufacturer’s attention away from overseas markets. In 2015 the Chinese 
government announced ambitious plans to scale up the annual installment to 17.5 GW, 
demonstrating a strong determination to support the domestic solar power generation market. 
Consequently, many firms are hesitant in choosing between a fully-fledged overseas oriented 
strategy in Africa and a traditional inward looking one. Several interviewees explained their 
dilemma by using a Chinese proverb: 瘦死的骆驼比马大, or a starving camel (referring to 
the Chinese market) is still bigger than a strong horse (referring to the African market)65. 
 
Conclusions: disaggregating ‘China’ and ‘Chinese investment’ in Africa 
 
Chinese wind and solar energy companies are becoming increasingly significant and influential 
in the transition towards renewable energy across sub-Saharan Africa and in the 
reconfiguration of the continent’s energy systems. There are multiple drivers for this emerging 
trend including the need to address excess domestic capacity (particularly with solar energy) as 
well as the domination of domestic renewable power generation markets by SOEs which has 
pushed private companies to seek opportunities in overseas and emerging markets. In terms of 
the key drivers behind the expansion of Chinese renewable energy enterprises our research 
found that the ‘go out’ of these firms to Africa offers them a valuable opportunity to transform 
from equipment producers to project owners/operators in overseas markets. The ‘pull’ of a 
favourable policy environment (e.g. RE-IPPPP in South Africa) and the strength of a recipient 
country’s commitment to renewables is also important here as is the perception of risk and 
political stability in recipient countries and the opportunity to ‘scale up’ their activities. In 
addition, we have also argued that the changing conditions and dynamics within Chinese and 
international renewable energy markets are significant drivers here. 
 
Far from there being some kind of sinister ‘grand strategy’ of phased expansion the state 
currently has a limited role in the promotion of China’s renewable energy activities in Africa and 
this is possibly because the volume of deals is not yet sufficiently large enough to generate any 
significant impact on diplomatic relationships. Rather than this being about a state-led attempt 
to export China’s clean energy revolution the decision to seek investment and export 
opportunities in emerging African markets has largely been driven by corporate strategies and 
competitive market logics rather than by political justifications and our research found that 
those companies who have been hit hardest in the domestic market are the ones that are now 
most actively exploring new business opportunities in Africa. Despite the lack of attention given 
to the role of quasi-state agencies such as the development banks or export credit agencies, 
our research illustrates that they are playing a decisive role in the expansion and diffusion of 
Chinese renewable energy technologies in Africa by identifying new market opportunities, in the 
analysis of ‘risk’ and in the provision of finance, in using their African ‘expertise’ to provide 
information and guidance, and (perhaps most importantly) in boosting the confidence that 
Chinese renewable exporters and investors have in emerging African markets. 
 
Given the scale and speed of China’s own domestic renewable energy capacity development 
and technology catch-up, it is often suggested that the Chinese central government is steering 
the process through the initiation of a comprehensive set of supporting policies and 
mechanisms. What is usually overlooked however is firstly the fragmentation and 
disaggregation of the Chinese state that is the result of decentralisation and internationalisation 
and secondly the growing influence of key business actors. There is no singular or coherent 
state-led push for Chinese overseas renewable energy investment and the wide variety of state, 
non-state and quasi-state actors involved suggests that it is crucial to disaggregate what we 
mean by ‘China’ and ‘Chinese investment’ in this context and to capture emergent forms of 
‘paradiplomacy’ amongst sub-national agencies and actors. There are a range of different firms 
and parts of the state engaging with different actors in Africa and pursuing a myriad of different 
energy developments which are not confined to renewables and which also include cooperation 
around nuclear energy and investments in high-carbon industries such as coal and gas. As a 
result, it is necessary to move beyond the simplistic but popular narrative of a monolithic and 
neo-colonial Chinese state plundering Africa’s natural resources which fails to recognize the 
simultaneous and growing involvement of China in the development and transfer of renewable 
technologies in Africa and its potential long-term significance in opening up new pathways to 
low-carbon development. 
 
In South Africa, Chinese firms have been involved in some of the country’s largest wind farms, 
as suppliers or manufacturers of technological components for solar PV, as the Engineering 
Procurement & Construction (EPC) company or as subcontractors. Their presence has had 
some significant implications for the cost and nature of manufacturing and assembly in South 
Africa where, partly as a result of excess Chinese manufacturing capacity, the cost of solar PV 
technology has dropped significantly and consequently the price offered by solar PV 
developers in South Africa for which they will sell their generation has plummeted. Further, 
some solar PV manufacturing/assembly plants originally established in South Africa with a view 
to supplying projects approved under RE IPPPP, have since had to resort to the assembly of 
components on behalf of Chinese suppliers which are then sent on to projects in Europe. This 
‘toll manufacturing’ enables Chinese manufacturers to evade recent EU/US anti-dumping 
legislation by sending the component parts (cells, frames, glass etc.) to South Africa for 
assembly prior to being offered by Chinese firms for sale to European markets. More might be 
done therefore on a bilateral basis to formalise the transfer of skills and technical knowledge 
between South African and Chinese actors in the renewable energy sector.  
 
Attributing involvement or project ownership in renewable energy to China can often be 
problematic given the ‘complex, transient and at times opaque nature of global trade and 
production networks and transnational and multi-national flows of investment and finance’66. 
This complexity is often missed by accounts which emphasise competition or conflict between 
Western and Chinese companies. Chinese companies are themselves ‘bound up in 
international networks of project developers, construction companies, technology providers and 
flows of national and international investment and finance’67. As a result, we argue it is critical 
to follow production networks and global supply chains in renewable technologies and to 
carefully trace the finance and development streams around individual projects. A focus on 
global production networks and value chains is particularly valuable here given its actor-centric 
approach to understanding the variegated, country and industry-specific development 
implications of south-south trade flows particularly those around renewable energy68. To 
overlook these complex production networks and value chains is to miss the important 
interdependencies that are beginning to emerge from China’s growing geo-economic influence 
in Africa. 
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